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Abstract 
In this paper I show how to semantically treat the cases in which a speaker reports the deferential beliefs of an agent. In this 
sense, I will adopt the semantic theory of belief reports put forth by Crimmins and Perry. After presenting their conceptual 
framework, I will consider that the deferential notions are the unarticulated constituents of the semantic content of an utterance 
by means of which we report a deferential belief. Therefore, in reporting a deferential belief, the speaker tacitly refers to the 
deferential items involved in the reported belief. This is the second part of a two-part paper. 
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1. Introduction  
In the first part of the present study, following Recanati, I have shown that an agent can have deferential beliefs. 
In this second part I will show how to semantically treat the reports of deferential beliefs. In order to analyse the 
reports by means of which a speaker informs us about the beliefs of an agent involved in burgean cases of deference, 
I will adopt the conceptual framework offered by Crimmins and Perry. 
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2. Crimmins and Perry’s analysis of beliefs and belief reports 
In Crimmins and Perry’s account, every belief b is a structured entity involving an idea with arity k and a k-tuple 
of notions (i.e., a sequence of k notions) (1989: 213). The content of a k-ary idea can be represented as a function 
which assigns to it a relation of arity k, and the content of a notion can be represented as a function which assigns to 
it the object the notion represents. In the same vein, the content of a belief b can be represented by means of a partial 
function which assigns to the pair made up of b and a time t a proposition p (1989: 211). On their account, a 
proposition is itself a structured entity made up of a k-ary relation and a k-tuple of objects (i. e., a sequence of k 
objects). Down below, I will use a polarity item i whose role is to indicate whether a relation holds between the 
propositional constituents, case in which i = 1, or not, case in which i = 0. 
Since propositions are the contents of beliefs and since these abstract entities are individuated in terms of their 
structures, it follows that the content of a belief b that an agent a has at the time t, will involve the constituents of the 
proposition p, that is the k-tuple of objects about which, at the time t, the agent a has a k-tuple of notions and 
between which the k-ary relation which constitutes the content of the agent’s k-ary idea holds. It must be mentioned 
that in Crimmins and Perry’s framework, a proposition which plays the role of the content of a belief, plays also a 
second role, that of the semantic content expressed by the that-clause of a belief sentence used in a context to report 
a belief (1989: 218). 
We have seen that notions and ideas are the items that form the structure of a belief and that objects – as contents 
of the notions – and relations – as contents of the ideas – are items which form the structure of a proposition. 
However, these ingredients are not enough to explain the difference between two beliefs or two propositions that, 
having the same structure, will involve the same number of items. Crimmins and Perry’s solution is to introduce a 
new ingredient in the structure of a belief, ingredient which will have a counterpart in the structure of the 
proposition. The role of this ingredient is to explain the order of the notions involved in a belief, as well as the order 
of the objects in a proposition. In this sense, they will say that a k-ary idea involved in a belief has a number k of 
argument places, and the k-ary relation involved in the propositional content of this belief has a number k of 
argument roles (1989: 214). Thus, the complete structure of a belief b includes, besides the k-ary idea and the k-
tuple of notions, a number k of argument places of the idea which are occupied by notions. Symmetrically, the 
structure of a proposition p, which represents the content of the belief b, includes, besides the k-ary relation and the 
k-tuple of objects, a number k of argument roles of the relation which will be occupied by objects. Leaving the 
mathematical details aside for reasons of space, it must be said that the relation between the argument places of an 
idea and the notions which occupy these places in a belief b can be represented by means of an assignment function 
from the set of argument places of the idea to the set of notions b involves. Also, the relation between the argument 
roles of a relation and the objects which occupy them can be represented by means of an assignment function from 
the set of argument roles of the relation to the set of objects involved in p. In the case of a belief b, the order of the 
notions involved in b will reflect the way notions are assigned to the argument places of b’s idea, and in the case of 
b’s propositional content p, the order of the objects which constitute p will reflect the way objects are assigned to the 
argument roles of p’s relation (1989: 214). 
Since an object, as a constituent of a proposition p, is the content of a notion involved in a belief b, it follows that 
the notion which occupies an argument place of the idea in b determines the object that occupies the argument role 
of the relation in the propositional content of b. In order to capture this in their semantics of belief reports, Crimmins 
and Perry introduce a responsibility clause which places internal and relational requirements on the reported belief 
(Crimmins, 1992: 155). With respect to the structure of the reported belief, what the responsibility clause requires is 
that this belief should involve certain representations of the constituents of the belief's content. With respect to its 
content, this time, it is required that the items involved in the reported belief connect with the argument roles of the 
proposition which constitutes the belief's content (Crimmins, 1992: 155). Therefore they will say that a notion n 
involved in a belief b is responsible for filling an argument role in the belief’s content p when the argument role of 
the relation in p is generated by the argument place of the idea in b with whom n is associated (1989: 214). In other 
words, a notion n of a belief b is responsible for an argument role in b’s content when n’s semantic contribution to 
the proposition p will be a constituent of p, more precisely that object which represents the content of the notion n 
(Clapp, 2010: 25).  
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In Crimmins and Perry’s semantic analysis of belief sentences, the context in which such sentences are uttered 
plays an essential role. As they consider that a belief sentence is sensitive to the context in which it is uttered, their 
analysis must capture this form of contextual dependence. One of the assumptions of traditional semantics is the 
existence of a perfect correspondence between the form and the semantic content of the sentences of a natural 
language. According to this assumption, also known as the principle of isomorphism, each propositional constituent 
of the semantic content expressed by an utterance of a belief sentence is the semantic value of a lexical item present 
in the surface syntax of the sentence (Neale, 2007: 273). The semantic analysis of belief reports offered by 
Crimmins and Perry shows that, when applied to belief sentences, the principle of isomorphism is not correct. On 
their contextualist account, in the proposition expressed by a belief report there are constituents that are not the 
semantic contributions of any component in the surface syntax of the belief sentence used to make the report. Since 
the application of the isomorphism principle is sanctioned in the case of belief sentences, the diagnosis is clear: the 
semantic content of a belief sentence uttered in a context c will not be exhausted by the semantic contribution of the 
that-clause in the belief sentence used in c to make the report (Perry, 2001: 50).  
According to Crimmins and Perry, in the semantic content of a belief report, besides the syntactically articulated 
constituents of the proposition expressed by the that-clause of a belief sentence, there are also constituents which are 
not syntactically articulated (1989: 220). Thus, every time a speaker reports the belief b of an agent a, by uttering a 
belief sentence, and the notions involved in b are not mentioned in the surface syntax of the belief sentence, these 
notions will be the unarticulated constituents of the semantic content of the belief report. Even though a notion 
present in the semantic content of a belief report does not constitute the semantic value of an item occuring in the 
syntax of the belief sentence, the speaker of the belief report tacitly refers to it simply because it is not necessary to 
syntactically specify a piece of information if it is implicit in a context and, therefore, it is accessible to the 
participants in the conversation (Crimmins, 1992: 158). Thus, according to Crimmins and Perry, the speaker of a 
belief report refers explicitly to the content of the reported belief and implicitly to the notions and ideas by means of 
which the constituents of the proposition expressed by the that-clause of the belief sentence used to make the report 
are represented. As the sequence of notions involved in the reported belief is contextually obvious, the speaker of 
the belief report will not refer to these notions by exploiting the linguistic material, but will tacitly refer to them by 
exploiting the available contextual information (Perry, 2001: 45).  
In Crimmins and Perry’s perspective, there are two categories of belief reports and therefore, there are two ways 
of semantically analysing the content of a belief report. The first category includes the belief reports that specify the 
notions responsible for filling the argument roles in the propositions which constitute the beliefs’ contents. Thus, in 
cases where the context of a belief report makes it obvious to the participants in the conversation which are the 
notions involved in the reported belief, we have to analyse the belief report in terms of notion provision (1989: 227). 
As they are provided by the circumstances in which the belief sentence is uttered, the notions will occur in the 
responsibility clause of the semantic content of the belief report. In cases like these, the notions involved in the 
reported belief are familiar to the participants in the conversation and the speaker of the report will tacitly refer to 
them (1989: 219). As they are not syntactically represented by any overt expression in the belief sentence, the 
notions are the unarticulated constituents of the semantic content of the belief report. Considering that B is a triadic 
relation between an agent a, a belief b and a time t, that n is a notion and that r is an argument role of a proposition 
p, Crimmins and Perry represent the semantic content of a belief report u in this category as follows (1989: 219): 
in( ) [ ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , )]p i iirContent u b B a b t Content b t p Responsible n r b         
It may not always be the case that a belief report should specify the notions responsible for filling the argument 
roles in the proposition which constitutes the belief’s content. In cases like these, the circumstances of the belief 
report do not offer sufficient information regarding the notions involved in the reported belief. This time, the 
semantic analysis of the belief report should be offered in terms of notion constraint (1989: 227). The speaker of a 
belief report of this type will tacitly refer to the conditions which constrain the notions responsible for filling the 
argument roles of the belief's content. Provided by the circumstances in which the belief sentence is uttered, the 
conditions constraining the notions will be raised to constituency, thus occurring in the responsibility clause of the 
semantic content of the belief report (Crimmins, 1992: 185). As they are not syntactically represented by any overt 
expression in the belief sentence, the providing conditions are the unarticulated constituents of the semantic content 
of the belief report (1989: 225). According to Crimmins and Perry, where C is a condition that a notion n must 
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satisfy in order to fill with its own content the argument role r of the proposition p, the semantic content of the belief 
report u will be represented this time as follows (1989: 225):  
in1
(( ) [ ( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ))]p i ik i iirContent u b B a b t Content b t p n n C n Responsible n r b              
3. Reporting deferential beliefs 
In what follows, I will adopt the format of the semantics of belief reports presented above in order to 
semantically treat the cases in which a speaker reports the deferential beliefs of an agent, beliefs which involve 
notions and ideas that the agent does not understand. 
As we have seen above, according to Crimmins and Perry, in cases where the circumstances of a belief report 
make it clear to the speaker and his interlocutors which are the notions involved in the reported belief, we have to 
analyse the belief report in terms of notion provision (1989: 227). Let us consider the case in which, following a 
series of medical investigations, Irina obtains from her doctor both the information that she suffers from arthritis and 
the information concerning the effects of this inflammation. Let us assume that Irina, deferring to the epistemic 
authority of the doctor, does not understand the exact meaning of the term ''arthritis'' occurring in the sentence by 
which her diagnosis was set. Now Irina has a deferential notion of arthritis. As this fact is known by both Mihai and 
his interlocutor, let us suppose that Mihai utters the following sentence: 
(1)   Irina believes that arthritis interferes with physical abilities. 
Uttering (1), the speaker is claiming that Irina has a belief which involves the deferential notion she has of 
arthritis and whose semantic content is the proposition that arthritis interferes with physical abilities. Being the 
relevant notion in the context of this belief report, Irina’s deferential notion will be tacitly referred to by the speaker 
of (1). Provided by the circumstances of the utterance (1), the deferential notion of arthritis will occur in the 
responsibility clause of the semantic content of (1). As it is not represented by any overt expression in the surface 
syntax of the belief sentence, Irina's notion of arthritis plays the role of the unarticulated constituent of the semantic 
content of the belief report. 
In this scenario, the belief report does specify the notion responsible for filling the argument role in the 
proposition which constitutes the content of Irina's belief. But what does the notion fill the argument role with? 
Given the fact that in burgean cases the referential content of a deferential item is identical with the referential 
content of the item being deferred, the only difference between the two items being located, as Recanati rightly 
showed, at the level of their kaplanian characters, it follows that the very same propositional constituent which 
represents the standard semantic contribution of the term ''arthritis'' will end up in the content of Irina's deferential 
belief (2000: 281). Therefore, Irina's deferential notion the belief report is about will fill with its own referential 
content the argument role in the proposition expressed by the that-clause of the belief report. Considering that t1 is 
the time of the belief report and ndarthritis is the deferential notion Irina has, the semantic content of the belief report u1 
made by uttering the sentence (1) can be represented as follows: 
1 1 1
1 2 1
d
arthritis
( ) [ (Irina, , ) ( , )
, : , : ;1 ( , , )]
Content u b B b t Content b t
r r Responsible n r b
     
 !! interferes arthritis physical abilities   
Let us now suppose a scenario, similar to the one mentioned above, in which the circumstances of a belief report 
do not offer sufficient information with respect to the notions involved in the reported belief. This time, according to 
Crimmins and Perry, the analysis of the belief report above should be given in terms of notion constraint (1989: 
227). In this scenario, the speaker of (1) is not directly acquainted with the deferential notion Irina has about 
arthritis. This time, the belief report does not specify the notion responsible for filling the argument role r1 in the 
proposition which constitutes the content of Irina's belief. Not being able to provide a notion for the report to be 
about, the speaker will tacitly refer to the condition which constrains the notion responsible for filling the argument 
role r1 of the reported belief's content. Uttering (1) in this context, the speaker is claiming that Irina has a belief 
involving some notion relevant to the current conversation, a belief whose semantic content is the proposition that 
arthritis interferes with physical abilities. Here, Irina's notion of arthritis is constrained by the condition of being a 
deferential notion and this providing condition, being raised to constituency, a fortiori becomes a constituent of the 
semantic content of the belief report. Provided by the circumstances of the utterance (1), the condition of being a 
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deferential notion of arthritis will occur in the responsibility clause of the semantic content of (1). Without any overt 
expression in the surface syntax of the sentence, the condition (of being a deferential notion) the belief report is 
about plays the role of the unarticulated constituent of the semantic content of the utterance (1). Considering that t1 
is the time of utterance and the condition C expresses the property of being (identical to) the deferential notion 
Rdoctor(narthritis) that n must satisfy in order to be responsible for the constituent which occupies r1, the semantic 
content of the belief report made by uttering (1) will be represented this time as follows: 
1 1 1
1 2 1
( ) [ (Irina, , ) ( , )
, : , : ;1 ( ( ) ( , , ))]
Content u b B b t Content b t
r r n C n Responsible n r b
     
 !!   interferes arthritis physical abilities   
What happens in a situation in which the agent has no notion n of an object and the speaker of a belief sentence 
states that the agent has a belief involving the representation n the agent has not? Let us suppose that, this time, 
Mihai utters the belief sentence (1) in a situation in which Irina has no notion of arthritis and implicitly no 
deferential notion. This type of cases can be explained by means of the concept of pre-assertive commitment 
introduced by Crimmins and Perry (1989: 224). Assuming that Irina has a deferential notion of arthritis, the speaker 
of (1) is attempting to claim that Irina has a belief involving that notion, a belief whose content is the proposition 
that arthritis interferes with physical abilities. In so doing, Mihai intends to provide a notion for his belief report to 
be about, specifically the deferential notion responsible for filling the argument role r1 of the content of Irina's 
belief, and tacitly refer to this very same notion. In this case, resting upon a referential presupposition that fails, his 
belief report will fail to express a proposition. Although the utterance (1) fails to express a proposition, the speaker 
of (1) is committed pre-assertively to the proposition that there is a notion involved in Irina's belief satisfying the 
condition of being a deferential notion of arthritis. Believing this proposition, Mihai attempts to provide the 
deferential notion Irina has of arthritis as a constituent of the semantic content of (1). His belief report would have a 
referential content only if the proposition to which he is pre-assertively committed would be true, conditioned by the 
fact that the condition of being a deferential notion would be met by any of Irina's notions. Let us now suppose that, 
in this context, Dora expresses her disagreement with Mihai by uttering: 
(2)   Irina does not believe that arthritis interferes with physical abilities. 
Given the fact that the notion the speaker of (1) attempts to provide fails to exist, the speaker of the belief report 
(2) raises the condition the speaker of (1) believes to be satisfied to constituency in her denial (2), this way directly 
contradicting the proposition to which the speaker of (1) is pre-assertively committed (Crimmins, 1992: 188-189). 
Uttering the sentence (2), the speaker wants to make obvious in the context of that belief report the fact that she does 
not believe that the condition C is satisfied. The speaker of (2) expresses the proposition that there is no notion 
satisfying the condition C of being a deferential notion so that Irina, at t, has a belief whose content is the 
proposition expressed by the that-clause of the belief report and in which the deferential notion is responsible for 
filling the role r1 of the content of her belief. What the speaker of (1) presupposed in his belief report, will occur, 
this time, in the responsibility clause of the semantic content of (2), as an unarticulated constituent of the proposition 
expressed by denying (1). Since there is no notion of arthritis involved in any of the Irina's beliefs and since the 
speaker of (1) presupposes in his statement that Irina has a deferential notion, his belief report cannot have a truth-
value, exemplifying a case of reference failure. Although this belief report is neither true, nor false, its denial 
displayed in (2) is true. Considering that t1 is the time of the report and C expresses the condition of being the 
deferential notion Rdoctor(narthritis), the semantic content of the belief report u2 made by uttering the sentence (2) will 
be represented as follows: 
2 1 1
1 2 1
( ) [ (Irina, , ) ( , )
, : , : ;1 ( ( ) ( , , ))]
Content u b B b t Content b t
r r n C n Responsible n r b
     
 !!   interferes arthritis physical abilities
¬
 
What happens in cases where the agent has a deferential notion of an object with which no idea of the object's 
properties is associated, and the speaker of a belief report claims that the agent has a belief in which his notion of the 
object is associated with a specific idea? Let us suppose that, deferring to the epistemic authority of a doctor who 
sets her diagnosis, Irina has only a deferential notion of arthritis. Her friend Dora, who knows the fact that Irina has 
a notion which satisfies the condition Rdoctor(narthritis), knows also what the scientific meaning of her diagnosis is. Not 
knowing the fact that Irina associates her deferential notion with no idea of the arthritis's characteristics, let us 
suppose that, in this context, Dora utters the following belief sentence:   
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(3)   Irina believes that arthritis is a metabolic disorder. 
Given the fact that, in this scenario, the belief report does not specify the notion responsible for filling the 
argument role in the proposition expressed by the that-clause of the belief sentence, the semantic analysis of the 
content of (3) should be in terms of notion constraints. Although the referential content of her deferential notion is 
identical with the referential content of the doctor's notion, this standard semantic contribution will not end up as a 
constituent in the proposition expressed by the internal sentence uttered in the belief report. In this case the problem 
is located at the level of the responsibility clause. As Crimmins and Perry would put it, in reporting a belief, a notion 
is responsible for the propositional constituent which occupies the argument role of the proposition expressed by 
uttering the that-clause of the belief sentence used to make the report, only when the notion involved in the reported 
belief is associated with an idea at the argument place that generates the argument role in the proposition 
constituting the belief's content (1989: 214). In this case, even though Irina has a deferential notion of arthritis and 
this notion has the standard referential content, the notion cannot fill with its own content the argument role in the 
proposition which the that-clause of the report pretends to express. This is happening because, having no idea of the 
metabolic disorder that Irina associates with her deferential notion, the argument role of the proposition that, in other 
circumstances, would be expressed by uttering, in a belief report, the that-clause of the belief sentence above, cannot 
actually be generated by an argument place of the idea. In cases where another speaker, in the circumstances 
mentioned above, would deny Dora’s belief report (3), he would make a true claim u’ whose semantic content can 
be represented, considering that t1 is the time of the utterance and C is the condition of being the deferential notion 
Rdoctor(narthritis), as follows: 
1 1
1 1
( ) [ (Irina, , ) ( , )
, : ;1 ( ( ) ( , , ))]
Content u' b B b t Content b t
r n C n Responsible n r b
     
 !!   metabolic disorder arthritis
¬
 
There are also cases in which the speaker of a belief report intends to make salient to his interlocutors the fact 
that the reported belief involves deferential notions. Let us assume that in a context like this Dora says: 
(4)   Irina does not believe that arthritis affects the mood.  
(5)   She (only) believes that “arthritis” affects the mood. 
where the quotes indicate that the agent deferentially uses the term “arthritis” which should be represented, in this 
context, as ‘Rdoctor(arthritis)’. The speaker of the first belief report claims that the agent does not have a belief which 
involves a normal, scientific notion of arthritis. What she claims instead, this being obvious in her second belief 
report, is that there is some notion involved in Irina's belief that satisfies a condition, that of being a deferential one, 
which is relevant in the context of utterance of this belief report. In so doing, Dora wants to make it explicit that, 
with respect to the referential content of the notion Irina has acquired by deference, the agent is not in a good 
epistemic position. In this case, even though Irina has an epistemically undetermined representation of arthritis, her 
deferential notion is semantically determined at the referential content level. Considering that t1 is the time of 
utterance and C expresses the condition of being the deferential notion Rdoctor(narthritis), the semantic contents of the 
above mentioned belief reports u4 and u5 will be represented, in this case, as follows: 
4 1 1
1 2 1
5 1 1
1 2
arthritis
( ) [ (Irina, , ) ( , )
, : , : ;1 ( , , )]
( ) [ (Irina, , ) ( , )
, : , : ;1 ( ( )
Content u b B b t Content b t
r r Responsible n r b
Content u b B b t Content b t
r r n C n R
     
 !! 
     
 !!   
affects arthritis mood
affects arthritis mood
¬
1
( , , ))]esponsible n r b
 
4. Conclusion 
I will conclude this paper saying that the speaker who reports an agent’s deferential belief, explicitly refers to the 
deferential belief’s content which is identical to the belief’s content of the expert to which the agent defers, and 
implicitly refers to the deferential notions and ideas involved in the reported belief which thus play the role of the 
unarticulated constituents of the semantic content of the utterance by means of which the deferential belief is 
reported.   
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